Autumn 1989
“How would you learn what statesmanship is?” “By studying statesmen.”
Your assignment is to prepare, plan, compose, write, revise, and polish an essay, of about 15 to 20 pages, on the statesmanship of Winston Churchill during his service as Prime Minister (as head of the National government of Great Britain) that led to the defeat of Hitler. It is to be handed in the week after Thanksgiving.
Churchill once called the Second World War “the unnecessary war.” Considering all that he has to say in The Gathering Storm, this remark must mean that in his view the war could have been averted by prudent and even costless action at a number of moments in the 1930s. Asked one time, how such a terrible war could have occurred, when so many sincere persons had appreciated the great suffering the First World War had visited upon Europe, Churchill said “No one had any plans.” One reason they had no plans to avert war is surely indicated by Churchill in the Gathering Storm, towards the end of Chapter XVII entitled “The Tragedy of Munich” (pp. 287-288 of our paperback edition).
Of course what Churchill did and said out of office during the thirties prepared the way for his statesmanship in office; it even sustained him during the shocks, mistakes, and reverses that occurred once he had attained office, initially as First Lord of the Admiralty and less than a year later as Prime Minister; without his fellow countrymen’s esteem for the prophet Churchill, “prince” Churchill could not have attained high office, or later continued in it despite the string of reversals, losses, and defeats Britain suffered, until she defeated Hitler’s Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain and persuaded America to join a war to make the world, for a while, safe for democracy.
Nevertheless, while Churchill may as a semi-private man have been “worthy of office,” not until he attained it, can we really see his statesmanship in action and judge it. The more power you have, the more you can do, thus the more glory you can gain, but thus also the greater your burdens, your toils, and your tears; so the greater your scope and the longer your office, the greater your chance of committing grave mistakes and perpetrating grave omissions, and thus all the greater weight of your guilt for particular evils and the more terrible your responsibility for consequences, unto unborn generations. Of course, as Churchill says, peoples do not need Statesmen to make easy decisions.
Your assignment then is to choose one of the difficult decisions (or series of decisions about a single matter) Churchill made as Prime Minister, to concentrate on it, study it, considering all that has or might be said about it, and thereby to reach significant conclusions about his statesmanship and perhaps Statesmanship itself.
One of the following instances or matters might recommend itself to you: the matter of Coventry, the bombing of the French fleet at Oran, the decision to fight on against Hitler (why not cut a deal as Pétain had? as Sweden was forgiven for doing), the friendship of Churchill and Roosevelt, the fall of Singapore, the decision for Torch, the Italian Campaign, the intervention in Greece, the situation in the Balkans, the other decisions regarding the “second front,” and the strategic bombing campaign (including Dresden), the various Conferences (Casablanca, Ottawa, Teheran, Yalta) and meetings, the Polish question (including Churchill’s confrontation with Stalin and with Mikolajczyk, the Free Pole leader), Churchill’s part in the Allies’ aid to the refugees (including the Jews), and his part in the repatriation of various Russians and others to Stalin.
These examples mix in various amounts questions of strategy, tactics, justice, the good, diplomacy, law, proportion, foresight, regimes, and the like, even friendship; you must decide what instance is best suited to judge the statesmanship of Churchill and to learn about Statesmanship itself. You must even measure your own strengths and weaknesses, so as to judge what you will do your best at. In order then to choose the best instance, you must have the foresight of a statesman and to carry through your choice, you must have all the other qualities of a statesman, save courage.
You all have copies of Churchill’s own account of World War II and thus his own account of his decisions. Of course, even if you esteem Churchill’s virtues, you will want to consult more than his own account, even if that only ends by confirming or augmenting your esteem. (In the House, Churchill once said, “Only history will tell,” paused, and then added, “And I shall write it.”)
So I have placed “On Reserve” the main additional sources you will want to consult: Churchill’s speeches, the pertinent volumes of the Martin Gilbert biography, namely the volumes entitled Finest Hour and Road to Victory (I have added my own copies to the Reserve; unfortunately, the companion document volumes to these have not yet been published); the memoirs of his personal secretary (John Colville) and personal doctor (Lord Moran). You will find interesting assessments of Churchill’s statesmanship in Churchill Revised A. J. P. Taylor et al (New York: Dial Press, 1969) and Statesmanship ed. Harry V. Jaffa (Durham: Carolina Academic, 1981).
No doubt more might be pertinent; how much and what, it is your duty to find out. Like the statesman, the student should beware being drawn into particulars too absorbing or a scene too limited, as Churchill was in the defence of Antwerp in W. W. I. Yet there can be no understanding of statesmanship without some particulars. The student must discern the particulars that are crucial and fix upon them alone, but of course that presupposes a sweep of all the particulars.
Perhaps other things Churchill wrote might provide illumination; his novel Savrola, his account of World War I in his World Crisis, or his various collections of essays and portraits of “Great Contemporaries.” (I have heard there is a book with Churchill’s habit of napping noted in the title; who knows whether that book might have something of interest in it, even something decisive for appreciating Churchill’s statesmanship.)
For background on the War, you might consult Chester Wilmot’s Struggle for Europe, Liddell Hart’s History of the Second World War, and the pertinent sections of Paul Johnson’s Modern Times. The first was written just after the war; the second, written much later, takes advantage of new sources and disclosures, especially about Enigma; the third sees the war in the context of most of the century (and in distinction from previous centuries).
I look forward very much to the results of your inquiries. In preparation: imagination; in inquiry: ardor; in execution: diligence; in writing: care.
Dr. Michael Platt
Friends of the Republic
Teaching Statesmanship With Churchill
notes: order: supreme objective (statesmanship); subordinate (Churchill’s); field (his deeds and speeches)
order: law, statesmanship; virtue; tragedy; God
What you have just read, above, is the paper assignment I gave my students last fall, in a course on Statesmanship, at Middlebury College, where I was a visiting professor. As in statesmanship itself, much chance and much ingenuity combined in the course. When I arrived in September, none of the books I had ordered in July had been secured, so I was constrained to give in to my predilection for Shakespeare, who is always available, and for more Churchill than I had first planned, though not more than love could propose and reason can justify. As in statesmanship itself, there were to be struggles, defeats, and victories.
To understand statesmanship among the ancient peoples, we studied several of Plutarch’s parallel Lives, of Caesar and Alexander, and of Cicero, whose own works on statesmanship, the De Re Publica, the Offices, and the “Of Friendship” provided us with observations and with questions for the rest of the course. Do the good and the expedient always coincide? Although Cicero says “yes” emphaticly in one place, in another he seems to have his Scipio urge otherwise: you are either to save the Republic, or become its dictator. Machiavelli, whom we read later, says explicitly and shamelessly that the statesman must learn to do evil. Does Churchill agree in the passage I point to above? Some students thought “yes” others “no.” Some according to their temptations, others not. A few, alas, according to their character.
After this introduction, we studied two things in parallel; Churchill’s History of the Second World War and Shakespeare’s Histories of the second part of the Hundred Years War, specificly the three parts of Henry VI in which we see the English who had just conducted themselves so gloriously under Henry V take up the aristocratic and clerical follies that soon cost them so dear and lead, step by foolish step, to the tyranny of Richard III, oppressor of men, seducer of women, and killer of children. Readers of these two studies of the follies that encourage vice and the virtues that must then oppose them belatedly will already understand the many rich likenesses to be discovered between them. A number of my students did in their papers; one even found that one of Churchill’s aides pointed out an apt passage from the Shakespeare to him. Additionally rich in provocation to study were the liberations that occurred all that fall of 1989 in Europe, of countries and peoples behind what Churchill was the first to call the Iron Curtain. Nor did it seem accidental that this same autumn a new Henry V, by Kenneth Branagh, appeared in the cinema, almost like an answer to the question that haunted our studies throughout the autumn: Can there be a Christian Statesman?
These were our studies, but the long written work of the students was devoted to Churchill and to the question posed above.
The results were instructive. Both the successes and the failures of these students tell us something about how we stand with regard to the great virtues of Winston Churchill and just how important it may be to attend to Churchill, to his statesmanship and to his virtues, so that we may benefit from the one and draw close to the other, for it is hardly possible, in difficult times, to adhere to his principles and to benefit from his sagacity, unless we have some of his great-hearted soul.
In their papers these students both erred and hit the mark in various ways. In fairness, in sagacity, and in virtue.
The virtue of youth is its “idealism” its holding up human life to high standards. Of course we all know the kind of youth who holds everything but himself to high standards, who insists that his college invest in no company not 99 and 44/100 % pure, but who himself does not think of doing without a thousand products sold by the same companies, or the student who is indignant about an injustice thousands of miles away, but not the one she just visited upon a roommate. Nevertheless, human life would be much the worse if the young did not aim high, feel self-contempt, and try harder. (For some with high standards will try harder and feel self-contempt, somethiing so much more beneficial than self-esteem.) The resignation that is sometimes appropriate in an old person seems unnatural in a youth, certainly sad. We are right to tell our children to brush their teeth, but we would be astonished and sad to meet a youth very much concerned with dental benefits, or who would not mind doing nothing and getting paid. The healthiness of youth allows it to be careless of health. Prudence may be the moral virtue youth most needs, is usually the last youth acquires, but it would not be good if youth were born with it.
It is right then for youth to be animated by high principles, by visions of purity, stories of heroism, and feats of excellence. Yet high principles alone are precisely the problem with statesmanship. So many just and good things in this world are bought at the expense of other just and good things. Moreover, there are so many incommensurate orders; beauty cannot be translated into strength, calculation into judgment, discernment into power. Thus so many solutions are not the best simply, but only the best possible. In actuality, few are even “the best possible.” And because of this, it is almost always possible to blame the statesman. Churchill tells us that “Statesmen are not called upon only to settle easy decisions. These often settle themselves. It is where the balance quivers, and the proportions are veiled in mist that the opportunity for world-saving decisions presents itself.”[1] Such decisions are often ones in which someone will be left hurt, justly or unjustly, but in any case hurt. And the hurt will seldom accept their hurt as the inevitable consequence of a sagacious decision. They may even lash out at the statesman, or, perhaps the case of Churchill in 1945, resent the very virtues he screwed them up to in their finest hour. Nor will a statesman, having made the best possible decision about a difficult matter, rest easy. The best possible is never the best, never wholly satisfying, never free of regret, and seldom free of guilt. Still if the statesman has enough magnanimity to make the difficult decision, he may have enough to bear the consequences.
The trap of Antwerp, too much absorbed in the episode. Especially if it invites indignation and self-pity. E.g. Jewish matters for a Jew. Greece for a Greek. [E.g. Aristotle Tziampiris.] The bombing of Dresden for a German. The Polish question for a Pole.
The general temptation to substitute secondary opinions for the hard work of investigating primary sources. Not that the primary sources are unavailable; there is plenty of Churchill and judicious works on him (e.g. Martin Gilbert). This is also an issue of fairness. Quite a few students did not consult the primary sources or Gilbert. Neither desire to know Churchill better, nor fairness to him as to any man, by giving each his chance to speak in his own defence, animated them. It is minimum scholarly probity when quoting a primary source, such as Churchill, from a secondary book to repeat the secondary author’s citation, so that the reader can seek it out. Of course this scholarly minimum falls short of the judicial minimum. Every man to be judged, whether in a court, in public opinion, or is a student’s paper, ought to be given a chance to speak in his own behalf. Quite a few students did neither. Every man ought also to be given a chance to cross examine his accusers. Again few students, even those who wrote a not injudicious report, fulfilled this requirement. If they concluded against Churchill, they did not let him speak. If they concluded for, they did not let the opposition speak.
These faults were, I think, all the more glaring, should have been glaring to these students, because Churchill’s own writing is so filled with the opposite virtues. Page after page of his accounts of political life, whether his own memoirs or his histories of others, is filled with not only his view but the views of his opponents. He not only conducted his political life in a parliamentary way, but wrote the history of others in the same way. (How different a likewise noble man can be is to be appreciated by reading DeGaulle’s account of the War.) Still, although quite a few students didn’t imitate these virtues of Churchill, quite a few of them could not but like Churchill.
However, before Churchill’s good humor overcame their (unjust) indignation, many became the prisoner of the first secondary book they read. Not having learned the habits of fairness (or the habits of inquiry), they went for the first impressive opinion they ran into. Often this fit with their choice of topic. Thus for a German born student this might be the bombing campaign against Germany, for a student of Polish descent it might be Yalta and all that was allegedly given away there, and for a Jew the question might be whether the Allies and Churchill could have done more. Following up my students, reading the books they had read and looking for more, I was surprised again and again to find important evidence only a page away from the passage they had seized upon to fit their thesis and their passion, for example the story Martin Gilbert tells in his Auschwitz and the Allies about the escape of Vrba and Wexler and the deliberate suppression by Jewish elders of the awful, detailed truth these escapees brought out of those fiery furnaces. One student, much to his credit, avoided this temptation, to go with your prejudgment. A Greek, he deliberately chose not to do Churchill and Greece, chose another topic, and wrote a fine, judicious paper.
Most of these students, even the better ones, assumed that statesmanship is something that can appear in a law court, either real or imaginary as theirs was; that is, many of the students assumed that they had understood Churchill’s statesmanship once they had examined his conduct in an episode and come to a fitting judgment of it. Judging it, they thought they had judged him, and judging him, they thought they had said something about his statesmanship. But this meant assuming that statesmanship can appear in court. Is there a Nurenberg for statesmen, or even a Nobel Prize? I doubt there could be. Churchill was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. Although it was well deserved, the Peace Prize would have been even more deserved, but the way the statesman protects the peace is too wise for popular assemblies to discern unless the hideous shadow of a tyrant, which their follies mau have armed, is falling upon them.
Some however did see that you might do the statesmanlike thing and not only not be able to make the case in court, but also not be able to be happy. Even when he is right the statesman suffers. Even if he is right and he can make it clear that he is, as Churchill could, with the bombing of the French Fleet, which the House applauded unanimously and the Americans took as proof Britain would not surrender, even then, there is suffering. Reporting that bombing to the House, Churchill wept. That he did may be inextricably linked with his statesmanship; he was great hearted. I can suggest the importance of the matter by drawing a contrast between Lord Kitchener and Henry V. As the movie “Breaker Morant” tells it, Lord Kitchener saw the judicial murder of the three crack soldiers in the Bush Velt Carabineers as a “sacrifice” worth making to keep Germany out of the Boer War and to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion. But the movie never shows Kitchener facing the consequences of his act; he is away when the lawyer comes to see him; he does not witness execution; he does not come to visit the men who are to die because of his orders; he does not make a case to them or to anyone for their “sacrifice;” he refuses to testify at their trial; and he never faces the charge that he is simply protecting his own reputation, not promoting a Peace Conference.
As represented in this movie, he could not be more different from Shakespeare’s Henry V, whose soldiers may well be fighting in a bad war, who may lose their lives in it, and may, it being unjust, jeopardize their souls before Almighty God Judge of the World. But Henry V faces these questions. And, in his magninity, he faces the same dangers, to both body and soul, that he asks his men to. He will neither seek ransom nor accept it. But his courage is not only soldierly, it is moral. He talks to his men; his royalty cloaked, he ascertains their state of soul, hears their fears and their accusations, offers them his arguments, and then before God faces the burden their questions have made vivid and pressing. Beyond what they imagine, he also faces the mystery of the sins of the father, how the God of nations may justly visit punishment of a father’s usurpation upon the son who has inherited the usurped crown. None of this does General Kitchener face. All of it or the like Churchill faced. (Alex Chang’s paper here!)
One student began by announcing all is relative, but as usual showed by page two she was not a relativist, but a unreflective partisan of the modern natural rights view of human nature (rights more important than duties and the desires screaming or whining through rights more important than anything). Like the young men who declared in 1933 that they would not fight for their country, she however would probably fight.
A few students chose their own topic. The best and the worst did so. (The best with permission, the worst without, as it turned out.) The best because they saw something important, or were disturbed by something important, something nobody else noticed, and wanted to follow it out, the worst because they wanted to go easy on themselves, to carry on the follies that had so far in college, and one supposes in life, allowed them to get along so well. Yes, there is a difference between politics and studies. The great follies that bring well-meaning polities to grief are eventually evident to their citizens, when some strong, diligent, cruel nation menaces and then conquers them, but the follies of colleges and schools are not so evident to the students who go along with them. Although they suffer from them, they do not know they suffer. Meanwhile their country declines. With trade being international, soon better educated nations will provide products and services that these students themselves will prefer to the ones they themselves produce.
The students also succeeded in fairness, in sagacity, and in virtue.
Tat Sang So’s essay.
Alex Chang’s essay?
Would the majority of these students fight for right and country? I doubt it. The vote would be much as it was in Oxford.
The West has won the Cold War. Everywhere from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, behind the Iron Curtain, the old nations of Europe have been liberated and are setting about the task of constituting civil societies and learning the ways of self-government. The prospects for success are greatest where there was the greatest suffering for liberty, in Poland especially; in Poland there was thirst for liberty, there was the attempt to practice it under oppression, and there was the confidence of faith; elsewhere it was all from outside and we must watch to see how those who were liberated primarily by others do.
And what are the consequences for the West of winning the Cold War. So far they are dismal.
First, the West may not have won through strength. True, under Mr. Reagan, the United States spent money on defence, flew Stealthily, threatened to build a High Frontier (SDI), built a 600 ship Navy, raided Libya, sent Stingers to Afghanistan, and put Pershings in Germany, but Mr. Reagan did not go to Anwar Sadat’s funeral, did not avenge the Marines blown up in Lebanon, saved the PLO, a Russian client, from destruction in Lebanon, and the United States did not think a Communist base in its own Caribbean harbor worth opposing with arms and men, and soon sacrificed National and Allied interests for hostages. Throughout, the United States was more concerned to hurt the best regime in all Africa, albeit a racist one, than to help some of the best rebels against the worst regimes. Meanwhile, Americans voted with their dollars against the goods they produced, preferring Japanese and German ones, promoted racism in affirmative action, slaughtered millions of the smallest and most innocent human beings among them, and continued to neglect the moral and intellectual education of their own children.
Second, no one, certainly no leader of a Western nation, is saying that the West has won the Cold War, no one is tying the withering away of Communism to its failure to match the West. No one is saying they withered because we kept up the pressure. Third, without an adversary, the West is in danger of sinking even more into comfort, which now means drugs, and thus sliding into the soft despotism Tocqueville warned of. It is a fact that the longest serving Secretary of State since Dulles recently advocated the legalization of drugs. It is a good bet that a united Germany will vote socialist and may get out of NATO. That is, just at the moment when West Germany’s staunch support of Nato (most recently in the Pershing showdown with the SS-20 and Nuclear Freeze Movement) has succeeded in (or contributed to) the collapse of East Germany, the newly United Germany may forget what made it possible to unite.
In short, without the menace of the Soviet Union the West may collapse.
Call: books out of print; precious little on the individual decisions C made. There should be a volume.
alternate words: high standards, who insists that his college invest in no company not 99 and 44/100 % pure, but who himself does not think of doing without a thousand products sold by the same companies, and invests in drugs he sells on campus,
General Features: compare Churchill to his creed: In war: resolution; in victory: magnanimity; in defeat: defiance; in peace, good will. He surely measures up, and yet that does not mean all his decisions were right.
Men in Dark Times
Consider his principles:
“Statesmen are not called upon only to settle easy decisions. These often settle themselves. It is where the balance quivers, and the proportions are veiled in mist that the opportunity for world-saving decisions presents itself.”
(Gathering Storm, p. 326)
“It is much better for parties or politicians to be turned out of office than to imperil the life of the nation.” (Gathering Storm, p.101)
It is important that the grievances of the vanquished be addressed before the victors disarm.
remarks on force
Gathering Storm, Chapter XVII entitled “The Tragedy of Munich” (pp. 287-288)[2]
“One rule of conduct alone survives as a guide to men in their wonderings: fidelity to covenants, the honour of soldiers, and the hatred of causing human woe.” (Marlborough Vol. VI, p. 600)
“In a deadly struggle it is not right to assume more burdens than those who are fighting for a great cause can bear.” (Hinge of Fate, 293) about how hard it is to do a supreme thing from a secondary position;
“The worst quarrels only arise when both sides are equally in the right and in the wrong.” (Gathering Storm, 219)
“The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone respects the Quakers. Still, it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding states. Their duty is first so to deal with other nations as to avoid strife and war and to eschew aggression in all its forms, whether for nationalistic or ideological objects. But the safety of the State, the lives and freedom of their own fellow countrymen, to whom they owe their position, make it right and imperative in the last resort, or when a final and definite conviction has been reached, that the use of force should not be excluded. If the circumstances are such as to warrant it, force may be used.”
The Gathering Storm, pp. 320-321
General difficulties: always presented with numerous decisions at the same time; at different levels; general decisions and particular ones; in different theaters; at home, abroad; production, weapons, morale; at sea, in the air, on the ground. The relation of political decisions and military decisions. Might one say that the great statesman must be both prince and general? Yet if he must be one, let it be the former. Churchill knew a lot about war.
His spirit: Drawing success from misfortune, confidence despite defeat, foresight from debacle. Fall of Tobruk a good example. The ultimate basis of this quality was surely his relation to his father. His return of love for hate.
Churchill served a constitutional democracy, in a national coalition government; at any time he could, by a vote of no confidence, be removed. To what degree was his statesmanship limited or frustrated by this condition? Was it an advantage to Stalin and Hitler not to have to face a vote? (Or even for Roosevelt not to have to face a vote for a determined time?) Or was it an advantage? For Churchill’s view see Gathering Storm, pp. 351-352.
From the failure of the Dardanelles campaign in WW I, Churchill knew the danger of trying to carry on a supreme project from a subordinate position; within Britain he was, during the war, always the supreme man, but only in the Battle of Britain was Britain supreme; when the Americans entered, they had to be consulted, as the war progressed, they became the dominant partner; finally, they barely consulted Britain. The atom bomb only added to their preponderance.
Churchill once told De Gaulle that when he woke up each morning he had to think about how to please one ally and hinder another. It must have felt like the Dardanelles all over, like trying to carry out a supreme plan from a subordinate position. Indeed it was the Dardanelles; once again the fate of Europe depended on striking up through the “soft underbelly” and preserving Europe from tyranny. It is doubtful Churchill ever forgot the character of his allies; how the Americans before the war had shirked their world responsibilities, abandoned Europe, and isolated themselves, and how the Soviets had tyrannized everything they could grasp. In supporting an alliance with Russia Churchill said he hoped that if Hitler attacked Hell, he would have a few good words to say for the Devil.” Is it not clear then how devilish Churchill considered the Soviets?
When should a supreme commander intervene in subordinate operations? How much can you intervene without enervating your subordinates? (On a big scale, America against its allies taking Suez in 1956.) When should you remove a subordinate? Churchill’s choice of subordinates. Auchinleck, Montgomery, Alexander, Wavell, Wingate, etc. The search for supreme men. For Lawrence and the like.
The attractions of a single theater, battle as a rest from larger burdens. Audacity and security at the personal level: when should the supreme man risk himself? (Tat Sang So’s essay.)
“Advantage is gained in war and also in foreign policy and other things by selecting from many attractive or unpleasant alternatives the dominating point.”
Gathering Storm, p. 202
The Supreme Purpose: Was Churchill right to put “defeating Hitler” at the top? Although he didn’t initiate it, didn’t that priority justify Roosevelt’s announcement at Casablanca that “unconditional surrender” was the Allied aim? Didn’t that announcement cement the German people to Hitler, thus prolong the war, and thus give Stalin time to get his armies deeper into Europe? No one was more aware of the danger of Stalin to Europe than Churchill, but shouldn’t he have made the freedom of Europe the supreme aim, rather than the defeat of Hitler? Certainly Churchill did not deceive himself about the end of the war; it was a triumph that was a tragedy, as the title of the final volume of his History confesses. Audacity or security at the strategic level. Auchinleck removed for caution, lack of audacity, inability to inspire confidence, but Overlord delayed and delayed and delayed, out of lack of audacity? Or was it done so in hopes of saving Eastern Europe?
In 1936, Churchill gave a speech in which he described the constant aim of British foreign policy, over 400 years, as such a defence of England. From this single aim flowed the means and the consequences. The means was the Navy. Britain had to defend her shores; soon this meant maintaining a peacetime fleet; that meant trade, which soon meant dependency on trade for sufficient foodstuffs; success over the years soon meant colonies, what with the new world discovery and, with turmoil at home, the desire of dissenters to leave; later after the defeat of old France in the 18th century and the defeat of Napoleonic France in the 19th, success meant such a navy as might control the high seas of the whole world. Foreign policy towards Europe sprang from the same root, the defence of England. Again and again over 400 years, England opposed whatever continental power threatened to unite Europe; again and again over 400 years, this meant the defence of the low lands, of Belgium and Holland, against such powers.
Three points follow. First, this means Churchill, who always admired Napoleon and long intended to write his life, would have had to oppose him, just as Pitt, Nelson, and Wellington did. (One might reread his account of the Napoleonic Wars looking for something that bears upon Churchill’s conduct in W.W.II; how do Napoleon and Hitler differ, Alexander and Stalin, Pitt and Churchill) Second, the origin of this foreign policy, which brought England again and again to greatness, and spread so much good, especially the good of self-government, lies in Elizabeth. It was under her subtle and wise reign that England gave up the hope of continental possessions. Instead she built up the navy and supported the low countries. Third, with regard to the Constant British Foreign Policy, Churchill is both faithful and a failure. He was faithful to it, he did everything he could, in word before he became Prime Minister, and after in word and in deed, in toil and in tears. Yet he failed. At the end of the war, although the low countries were safe and France recovered, half of Europe was under the sway of a continental power (Russia), America was ready to withdraw and England ready to disarm.
Did the concentration on Hitler, perhaps behind it the hatred of Hitler, make the pursuit of victory, unto “unconditional surrender,” cruel, unjust, unmagnanimous? Did the defiance with which Churchill met defeat, the resolution with which he carried on war, mean that the victory could not be magnanimous, and the peace would certainly be ill-willed?
Fight On: No, strike a deal; 1) model of Sweden, forgiven even by Churchill for striking a deal; 2) model of France, Pétain’s arguments, “save France” (i. e. the countryside and the population, but not honor or sovereignty) or, stronger, “join ‘em” since the Western democracies are so weak; 3) you will lose anyway. Against the first, Britain was not overrun like Sweden; though weak, Britain was growing stronger, and had the narrow Channel to frustrate assault and to prepare behind. Against the second; the country was stronger than its feckless leaders; though foolish, it was not heartless; and might be capable of a finest hour. Against the third: the RAF pilots had proved good in the air battle over France, indeed better than the Germans. Britain could defeat Hitler‘s attempt on Britain; defeating that attempt would bring in America; and that would eventually defeat Hitler. Fourth Argument: Churchill’s own: there is more glory in such a finest hour, even if it does not succeed, than in any negotiated surrenders. Surrenders may be better or worse, but there are no finest surrenders.
Oran: (Finest Hour pp. 175-212) How much warning were the French sailors given? Might negotiations have achieved a surrender? One source says Admiral Darlan never conveyed choice three to his council. Painful, to kill 1222 sailors of your ally, or is it former ally, ally now turned coat; the distinction between a country and a regime; a country and its government; nature of the Fleet, powerful enough to tip the balance against Britain in the ensuing Battle of Britain; but destroying it convinced the world Britain would fight not deal; esp. convinced the Americans (consider Cordell Hull’s testimony); opinion of De Gaulle; opinion of Pétain et al; opinion of Reynaud; release of French from “no separate peace” agreement, upon explicit condition that French Fleet not fall into enemy hands. A little earlier, Britain had offered proposed brotherhood with France; every Frenchman would also be a citizen of Britain and every Britain a citizen of France. (This would have meant a post-war union of the two great powers.) Churchill’s speech to the Commons; their remarkable response; Churchill’s tears. The hope of France was with Churchill. The French families placed Union Jacks beside French Tricolour on the graves of their sailor sons killed at Oran.
Strange, it may have been best that France refused; had they put the fleet in British hands or even scuttled it themselves, the British resolve never to surrender would not have been as apparent to the world, and thus the American appreciation of it so great, and without that Roosevelt might not have sent the 50 destroyers, signed Lend-Lease, and made alliance with Britain and won the war. On the other hand, what if the British had acquired the French Fleet and a greater portion of French allegiance therewith. Might they have been strong enough in the earlier years of the war to gain such successes as would then allow them to prevail upon the Americans to act so as to keep Stalin out of the heart of Europe? Oh, those brittle and weak French. Brittle in war, weak in defeat.
The Baltic States;
Churchill opposed, of course, the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. However, when the United States wanted Stalin to give them up in accord with the Atlantic Charter, Churchill disagreed, “But now, three months later, under the pressure of events, I did not feel that this moral position could be physically maintained. In a deadly struggle it is not right to assume more burdens than those who are fighting for a great cause can bear.” (Hinge of Fate, 293) This seems to be the principle that eventually justifies C. to accede to Soviet domination of Poland and to not doing as much as he wished for Jewish refugees. [Add what AIS calls the last secret, see Nicholas Bethell’s book]
Post War Purpose:
No man in our century was more aware of the danger Bolshevism posed for all civilized life. Churchill knew of the NAZI-Soviet pact, the mutual division of Poland, and the Soviet desire to annex the Baltic States. Although he argued for an alliance with the Soviets, it is hardly likely that he forgot what the Soviets were. In the Commons, he said that he hoped that if Hitler invaded hell, he would have a few good words to say on the Devil’s behalf. Is it not likely then that he never ignored the danger that Soviet victories would pose for Europe. (Moran says that as early as December 1943, Churchill thought of Alexander as the man to take an allied army, through Italy, to Eastern Europe. p. 155)
Pearl Harbor: (7 December 1941) May one even wonder if Enigma allowed Churchill to know of Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor? Ah, there would be a question of a statesman: if you know, should you tell the Americans so they could defend? Or not, so a to make sure they would declare war? Or tell Roosevelt, and let him decide? In a later communication Churchill tells him that before America’s entry, Britain had intercepted some of America’s secret diplomatic communications. So, did they not intercept the Japanese?
Fall of Singapore: (15 February 1942) Should Churchill have anticipated both the Japanese entry into the war and their strategy once they were in? Especially after the daring long range attack at Pearl Harbor? (What if anything did Enigma contribute?) Until a few weeks before its fall, Churchill did not know that Singapore was undefended from the land-side. In two years since the war had begun while every port in England (and most elsewhere?) had been fortified by land as well as by sea, Singapore had not. How responsible was Churchill? After the fall and during the no confidence vote that preceded it Churchill was depressed. He rallied the House and in some degree the nation, but still seemed to his intimates less cheerful, resolute, and confident than in the Battle of Britain. There were two reasons and one cause. The two reasons were that the fall of Singapore was a disaster; it would make all else harder in the Pacific. Second, the surrender suggested that British manhood was not very manly. While the Russians were fighting bravely in the snows on a long front and the Americans at Luzon, the British surrendered. This could only make Churchill’s chance to keep the Soviets out of Eastern Europe harder. The cause was that Churchill felt responsible for not knowing that Singapore was undefended from the land. Not more responsible than all the various commanders who could at any time, and should at some time, have told him, but still responsible.
Casablanca Conference: (January 1943) Churchill’s own account includes the admission that he did not remember quite how the “unconditional surrender” announcement of Allied war aims came about; even as he corrects it, however, the record does not seem clear. Martin Gilbert’s account also differs. Nevertheless, it does seem that the matter was discussed by Churchill and Roosevelt, that Churchill shared the draft statement with the War Cabinet, that they approved (only expressing concern that Italy not be left out), that no one asked how it might affect German attempts to oust Hitler, and that the announcement reflected general agreement (contrary to Churchill’ assertion that he was surprised by Roosevelt’s announcement).
Churchill addresses the charge that this announcement prolonged the war, but he does not address the specific question of its affect on German efforts to oust Hitler. One thing is most interesting: Churchill makes it clear he did not want surrender to come as a result of any Fourteen Points and then be able to claim and feel that they were betrayed. He also argues that any spelling out of the principles and distinctions that would govern Allied conduct after a cessation of hostilities would have had a worse effect. Churchill does not address the question why not announce “Surrender” as the aim and then the same explanation as follows in the chosen announcement.
In “The Dream” written in 1947, Churchill makes his father, having heard of “unconditional surrender” observe, “No one should be forced to do that. Great people forget sufferings, but not humiliations.”
Is not “Unconditional Surrender” related to “Strategic Bombing” and to the “Overall Strategic Aim”?
The Bombing Campaign:
From the beginning British bombing followed NAZI bombing. As Churchill argued to Chamberlain, let us not do what the enemy plans to until they have. Hitler moved quickly from strategic or military bombing to area or civilian bombing, from destruction designed to deprive the enemy of the means to fight to destruction designed to deprive the enemy of the will to fight. Coventry was terror bombing. So was Dresden.
There were two improvements in the art of bombing as the war went on. Bombing became more accurate and in bombing Hamburg the British discovered fire bombing, or how to set a whole city afire. Despite the first improvement, it remained true that night bombing was both less accurate than daylight bombing and also less risky for the pilots. Towards the end, however, there was less difference in risk, as the German fighter defences dwindled and disappeared. Because of the second improvement, the damage area bombing could accomplish increased enormously. 554 British citizens died in the Coventry raid; somewhere between 100,000 or even 250, 000 German citizens died in Dresden. [Of this proportion Seth Benardete said, “yes that’s about right.” meaning just]
Did the Allied bombing campaign make sense? Was it effective? Was it just?
What is strategic about area bombing? If it didn’t reduce the English, or break their resolution, why would it reduce the Germans? Moreover, while you are bombing populations, are you not neglecting a single vital link, whose destruction could destroy the enemy’s capacity to wage war? Why not hit oil refineries over and over? Or munitions plants? Why not hit the ball bearing plants? (Speer’s point) That the Germans had initiated civilian bombing, does that justify continuing it? Let us grant that there is retributive justice and ask why should the German civilian population not suffer things their government visited upon the British first? Still, what about proportion? Does Coventry justify Dresden? 554 versus 100,000 to 250,000? Was the aim retributive only? Or was it also political, to sap the war effort and drive a wedge between the German people and the NAZI regime? If so, how could it, given the Casablanca declaration of “unconditional surrender” as the Allies war aim?
Why was the bombing never linked up with the NAZI treatment of Jews? Wouldn’t that link have been its best justification? Or a part of it? (Or maybe not: what the NAZIs did to the Jews, German and Foreign, was terrible; it was against the innocent, the vulnerable, and, in the case of German Jews, against their own citizens, many of whom had after all served Germany in WW I, but it was not the only terrible thing they did, nor the most comprehensive; every one of the 30-40 million other deaths in the War were either the direct or indirect result of the NAZIs making war on Europe.) recommendation
What was intelligent about Strategic Bombing? Wasn’t carpet bombing mindless? Wasn’t it a mass effect? Another modern substitute for virtue? Wasn’t it the same thing that trench warfare was in WW I, the very opposite of daring and intelligence? Wasn’t Because of Allied dawdling, because of Allied caution, because of immense preparations and lack of spirit, the Allies often felt, looking at all the Soviet Army was doing, all their suffering and their success, the Allies often bombed out of frustration, out of a sense of “we must do something. We have to say something to Stalin.” It was an easy way out of the fundamental problem, Allied inactivity on the ground; it was an evasion. And of course the usual wishes of every service to be active. So, we have a policy rooted in revenge and caution, resentment and small spirit. All the very opposite of the Dardanelles campaign that the daring young Churchill proposed to end the mindless slaughter on the Western Front.
What was just about the Strategic Bombing, especially the fire or carpet bombing of Hamburg and Dresden? Wasn’t it like Ludendorff’s unrestricted submarine campaign at the end of WW I, which brought the United States into the war and led to the defeat of Germany? Isn’t fire bombing a defenseless city as reprehensible as sinking undefended merchant shipping? Doesn’t the air campaign of Marshall Arthur Harris represent the usurpation of civil authority by the military? To be sure, Germany was not neutral, like the neutrals Ludendorff attacked, and Germany had begun by attacking in Belgium. To be sure, the Germans had begun civilian bombing designed to terrorize and demoralize the people.
Even if it did not demoralize the Germans, sap their war effort, encourage and uprising or shorten the war, might it be just? First of all because retributive just is just. The Germans went for Hitler, they supported his conquests, his terrors, his exterminations, and enjoyed his successes. What could be more just then for them to share his misery and to feel the very kind of destruction he and they had visited upon Britain and every one else. 554 versus 100,000 to 250,000, that’s about right.[3] Second, it is important for the Germans to emerge from the war aware of their responsibility for the war. After the first WW the Germans felt betrayed by Wilson’s Fourteen Points, by the vengeful Peace, and the imposition of a liberal democracy. Feeling at once victimized, humiliated, and vengeful, the Germans were not about to acknowledge any moral responsibility for WW I, from the rape of Belgium to the unrestricted submarine campaign. Churchill was for a magnanimous peace, but not for a peace that would permit another moral evasion. The solution: punish the Germans now. What the whole world knew they had done was enough to justify the air campaign. What was later learned at the Camps only added to the justice. Everything, including Dresden, was just. What about this argument?
However, it is important to note that Martin Gilbert’s account suggests strongly, if it does not prove beyond the shadow of a doubt, that Churchill did not approve of Dresden, that it was done when he was out of the country, that he was not informed of the damage or casualties, and that when he learned he not only disapproved but called for a reexamination of the policy that might have been cited as authorizing it.[4] This account together with the documents it cites at some length also shows that there had long been a tension between the intentions and enthusiasms of the British Air Force under Marshall Arthur Harris and the wishes of Prime Minister Churchill.
Other sources suggest that Churchill felt remorse about the air campaign; of course, remorse is not quite the same as guilt. One might feel that although certain things done by one’s subordinates, in excess of general orders and without one’s specific approval, were partially one’s responsibility, they were not one’s primary guilt. Then again, a man such as Churchill might well feel that the honor of Britain was compromised by Dresden, and he might feel this personally, even though Harris, not he, was primarily or solely responsible.
To be sure, Churchill was not a man to be very wrong about other men. He surely knew the man. At the end of the War Churchill omitted only one service head from the honors distributed upon victory; others were given peerages, Harris was not. However, might this merely mean Churchill used Harris to do his dirty work and then discarded him? Was Harris his Exton? Was Harris Churchill’s Remirro de Orco? Or does no-peerage mean Churchill found out the extent to which Harris went while deceiving him, especially about Dresden, and treated him accordingly?[5]
In any further investigations of this matter one should not underestimate Churchill. Throughout his Marlborough volumes he shows the reader how an intelligent statesman must again and again achieve a result without letting lesser men know how he does it and even sometimes that he has done it The broad results, of course, he hopes will be evident. Who won the battle will be clear and even clearer who won the war. But the means, especially the way the great man keeps everybody in the dark, that must remain secret, or only evident to those with the capacity to imitate it. Churchill brings all this to light, not only though the lucky find of Marlborough’s candid correspondence with his wife Sarah, but again and again by explaining some episode or conversation. (Give an example; the one with the nagging fool.) Obviously the great statesman keeps his enemies in the dark, until his traps are sprung on them. Even more important, the great statesman must keep his allies in the dark, and not only in the dark for a while, like his enemies, but forever. He may have his reasons for publishing his memoirs, but never his reasons for revealing all his tricks. Even when he is dead, he will want his book to continue the work of his life. If we find sagacity in the life, why not in the book?
A Speculation:
Two things seem incontestably clear. First, Churchill early doubted and later must have known that civilian bombing (call it “area,” “fire,” or “carpet”) would not appreciably reduce the enemy’s war production and would not at all reduce their will to fight. Judging from the British nation’s response to Hitler’s civilian bombing, it might even make a people more resolute, especially if combined with an announcement of “unconditional surrender” as the war aim. This or most of this Churchill must have known.
Second, Britain was weak in all but the air, Stalin was very strong on the ground. Throughout the war, Churchill was anxious to show Stalin that the Allies really were doing their utmost to bring Hitler down, not letting Russia bear the brunt, and not going to sign a separate peace. These anxieties only grew as the war proceeded and the Western Allies kept postponing the opening of a second front. Churchill also appreciated the importance of the peace that would follow victory over Hitler. Had he not seen the terrible peace following W.W. I, at once vengeful and imprudent, prepare for another war? What would Europe look like after Hitler? Above all, what would East Europe look like? His anxiety on this point was there from the beginning; it was the motive behind his attempts to gain success in the Balkans and in Italy, so that Alexander might go for Vienna. It became more acute as Stalin progressed, as the Americans insisted on the Normandy landing, as they withdrew strength from Alexander, and then as the Allies Invasion Army made such slow progress after Normandy.
Put together, might these admitted features of Churchill’s conduct reveal his true, unadmitted, overarching design?
In the early stages the bombing campaign was to please Stalin, who liked to see films of destruction. It was not to stop Germany. It was not to make the Germans collapse in front of Stalin. Had it been, it would have hit military and industrial targets solely; it would have been truly strategic. It wasn’t; it was a show. Without speeding the day of Germany’s downfall, it assuaged Stalin. What would be the point of knocking Germany out, if Stalin was the great gainer. While Stalin proceeded slowly, Churchill still had a chance of getting Alexander’s army to East Europe, and even of getting the cautious Americans going.
One should compare the bombing campaign with the allied progress towards Germany; might it intensify as the chance that the Western allies would gain more of Germany than Stalin by it increased? One should also compare these two progresses with the use of information from Enigma? Enigma was never shared with Stalin. (Right?) However, its results sometimes were. Was Stalin only informed of things that threatened his whole line? And not informed of things that would increase his speed of advance?
The Statesmen and His Friends: the friendship of Churchill and Roosevelt certainly contributed to the Triumph, but also to the Tragedy; its greatest fruit was the American contribution to Torch; despite the evidences of friendship with Stalin, in toasts and testimonies, one may doubt they ever included an underestimation of the tyrant; Churchill cannot have forgotten all he thought of the Bolsheviks, the NAZI Soviet pact, the swallowing of Poland, etc; mark also Churchill’s deeds: was there ever a time when he did not try to position English-speaking armies so they might get into East Europe ahead of the Soviets.
Jewish Refugees: By starting a European, indeed a World War, the NAZIs became responsible for about 50 million deaths. IN addition to all the combatants they killed, the NAZI armies killed 10 million non-combatants of all nations; in addition they killed 6 million Jews. The nations and races of East Europe they intended to enslave, the Jews they intended to exterminate. To this end they created the “camps.”
As the Allied armies approached a camp, the NAZI killed all the inmates they could. Hear one story:
A few Jews had managed to hide in Buchenwald during the ‘evacuation’ of April 8. One of them, Israel Lau, was only eight years old. He had been kept alive by the devotion and ingenuity of his older brother, Naftali, aged nineteen. Three days after most of the Jews had been marched out of the camp, American forces arrived. One of the American officers, Rabbi Herschel Schechter, later recalled how he pulled a small, frightened boy from a pile of corpses. The rabbi burst into tears and then, hoping to reassure the child, began to laugh.
‘How old are you?‘ he asked Israel Lau, in Yiddish.
‘Older than you.’
‘How can you say that?’ asked the rabbi, fearing the child was deranged.
‘You cry and laugh like a little boy,’ Lau replied, ‘but I haven’t laughed for years and I don’t even cry any more. So tell me, who is older?”[6]
Charge: More Jews could have been saved! Charge: Should have said more! Particular Charge: Might have bombed rail lines leading to camps, for example at Auschwitz!
Defence: First, winning the war ought to be the prime objective. Second, no refugee plan ought to aid the enemy. There should be no dealing with the NAZIs. Third, Churchill favored a Jewish army. Churchill acted to keep the border of Spain open. Many other acts mentioned by M Gilbert? Opinion of Weizmann? Of Ben Gurion? Of Jonas? And Arendt’s double charge: there was a pusillanimous lack of resistance and morally compromising willingness of Jewish leaders to make deals with the Nazis.
Why is genocide the worst crime? To be sure it is likely to mean the killing of a great number of human beings. Apparently, that is not the point, but rather the killing of them for their race? But doesn’t elevating genocide to the “worst” mean encourage racism, in the sense that one now considers membership in a race more important than membership in the species, being a this, a that, or the other more important than being a human being.
Although it is “natural” to be concerned with the unjust treatment of any group in which one counts oneself a member, are there any good arguments why everyone ought to be more concerned with our group than other groups being similarly treated? Hitler rounded up Gypsies as fanatically and thoroughly as Jews. Shouldn’t one be equally concerned? And why limit our concerns? Like all tyrants, Hitler hated all virtuous, decent, and innocent human beings not willing to submit to his will. By making war on the World, wrecking havoc on Europe, Hitler and his helpers were responsible for the 30-40 million deaths.
And what about now? There is no NAZI regime anywhere? How admiring should one be of those whose ruling indignation is against regime that, being gone, poses no living threat whatsoever?
What of Arendt’s question? Why didn’t the Jews resist? Resist more? Surely no people turned the cheek more. Oppressed, they did not resist. Rounded up, they accepted death dignifiedly. OR was it supinely?
And what of the collaboration of the Jews? Did not many of the elders bargain with the NAZIs. Rudolph Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, having memorized names, faces, dates, train numbers, over many months months, escaped from the central death camp, Auschwitz, in April 1944; their accounts checked out with every account from other sources; fatefully just at the same time Jewish elders entered into negotiations with Adolph Eichmann to “save” some Jews. And so, the most accurate report of what was going on at Auschwitz that there could ever be was not expedited to the Allies.
One should consider Churchill’s essay “Moses.” How he understands Moses on the basis of his self-knowledge. How Churchill compares those times and his times. How the sufferings visited upon the Jews in both times led to their departure from the land of suffering, their wanderings, and their eventual establishment in the almost promised land of Israel. One should also compare the leadership of Moses and Churchill.
The Polish Question: Britain, led by Chamberlain, declared war for the sake of the freedom and sovereignty of Poland. When they did so, the Soviet Union had already signed a pact with the NAZIs. Soon both made a meal of Poland. Was it to fight and defeat Hitler only to see free Poland swallowed by the Soviet puppet state? Considerations: when Hitler swept into Czechoslovakia in 1938, Poland bit off a piece of its stricken neighbor. The Free Poles refused an earlier arrangement which, while moving the eastern border of Poland, did offer them a free Poland. Delay meant that Stalin had time to set up the Lublin puppets. Churchill did not play with a good hand; the Soviets were in place, on the ground, with troops, which the combined might of Britain and America would not outweigh, even if they had been nearby; nevertheless, Churchill played his hand as best it could be. We judge a good poker player not by how he plays a winning hand dealt him by chance, but by how he wins with a poor hand, or how, although not winning, he strives his best to. So should we judge the Statesman, Churchill.
Yalta; the Charge: Lost Eastern Europe; appeared to give support or at least acquiescence to this loss; moral contradiction, for the West war began with the defence of Poland. Defence: The Soviets were there on the ground; the Americans doubted they would stay in Europe very long after victory; Churchill got all three to support a United Nations; having signed on America was likely to take on world responsibilities; Churchill got De Gaulle recognized and France a seat in the Security Council; Churchill had already got Stalin to stay out of Greece and Yugoslavia.
The lost of the east of Europe after the war was not the result of Yalta. The east of Europe was lost in the ‘30s when the Britain and France did not stop Hitler; as a consequence, when they decided to fight, they could only defeat Hitler with the help of the worst, longest tyranny ever to cover a portion of the earth. Second to the Soviet Tyranny itself, most responsible for the enslavement of east Europe are the western democratic appeasers and isolators, who did nothing to remove the Bolsheviks at the end of W. W. I and who did nothing effectual to remove Hitler as he waxed strong. The time to have defended Poland was when Hitler threatened Czechoslovakia.
Those who howled about Yalta should in each case be asked what they were advising during the ‘30s. Those of us who come after should ask ourselves what we would have been advising and looking around in the present to see if there is some tyranny we are tempted to appease or ignore. In the world, in our country, in our profession.
Guilt of the Vanquished and the Justice of the Victors:
The Morgenthau plan to return Germany to a rural condition (i. e. kill 30 million), its acceptance, and its rejection; Stalin’s suggestion that the whole German Officer Corps (50,000 men) be killed[7] and Churchill’s indignation; the Nuremberg Tribunal; Helmut Kuhn’s Freedom Forgotten and Remembered; the Marshall Plan and Truman. Hitler was surely guilty, and his circle, but what about the rest? All Germans? The children and the young, infirm and the feeble? Perhaps only those who voted for him. 13 million, but how will you punish so many? How will you establish from secret ballots who voted for him? And even if you succeed, how will you distinguish between those voters who took him at his word and those who read his lips and wanted even more? You say all who voted for him or supported him actively should be punished? Very well, how about his supporters outside Germany? His sympathizers? Members of National Socialist parties in England, in France, in the low countries, and elsewhere? And if you go further than that to include also all those who did not oppose him, then to begin with you are including many who voted against him, but later acquiesced; you will then be punishing his opposition, who opposed him when the regime included the possibility of opposition. You say they did not oppose him later; you say all those who do not oppose the tyrant support him and should in some proportion suffer for not having done so? But then you must include all the appeasers in the West too; all the foolish politicians, all the pacificists, and all the majorities who voted for them and supported them? So, in the end your wish to punish must include not only the vast majority of the enemy but a very large majority of your own people and those of your allies, everyone who appeased, or acquiesced, or isolated themselves. Fiat justitia, pereat mundus.[8]
In particular you must also, in this war, punish those among your allies who did the same things as your enemies did. You must surely then punish the Soviets for making compact with Hitler, for invading Poland, for killing the Polish Officer Corps, for wholesale killing of prisoners, and for spreading tyranny. Are you prepared to do that?
Is it not better then for the victors to reason that enduring war is good enough punishment for the Western appeasers, and enduring war and defeat is quite good enough punishment for the German people. Sufficient unto the war is the punishment thereof.
What did the war show? What did it show about the souls of modern men? Did the democratic armies, made up of souls more formed by daily newspapers than daily prayers, fight well? Did the Allied armies ever fight well? Did not several British armies surrender without a fight? One in Egypt and one at Singapore? Dunkirk was an escape, Patton’s rush to the Bulge was a rescue, after Normandy the invasion force was bottled up. Did an Allied army ever defeat the Germans except when it was superior in numbers and arms? Kesselring without air-intelligence always knew which way the Allied army would approach. Not only did the Allies have more men and more arms, they always had the Enigma (??) code; thus, they always knew what the enemy was about to do.
Aside from Montgomery at El Alamein and Patton in Sicily, are there any flashes of genius? Are their victories very shining? Patton came to the rescue in the Battle of the Bulge, but doesn’t the fact that it was a rescue and the whole way Patton was treated show the mediocrity of the Allied war effort, massive but cautious. Patton slapped a soldier, was put aside, and how many soldiers died as a result? Daring such as he had saves lives. Not immediately, it is true, but in the end decidedly. At one point Eisenhower whined that Sicily could not be invaded because there were two whole German divisions there. The battle of the Bulge occurred because Eisenhower’s line was too thin; the clouds neutralized the Allied air advantage, and the Germans went for Antwerp. They were only stopped by the bravery of the American troops; the man in the street was better in the trenches than at headquarters. How much shorter would the war have been if Patton had been kept in command? Why was he restrained towards the end, allowed to rescue horses but not countries? How many people were enslaved after the war because this gifted general was not permitted to fight?
Weren’t the Western Allies superior in arms and numbers, in supplies, in production, in support and in tonnage, but inferior in resolution, in political foresight, and daring, above all in daring. And thus taking far too long to subdue Hitler. Thus, losing the fruits of victory. A war that ended without peace and with a more terrible tyrant in the heart of Europe. Is it not the same story in the air and at sea as on land? The Allies always had the radar to tell them where the German planes and submarines were. (Consider the movie “Das Boot.”) And if then one were faced with a choice between Hitler and Stalin as allies, leaving aside that the one was closer than the other, would the choice be clear? Is there a choice? In both we find Jew-hatred, militarism, and socialism. The NAZIs were more national but less totalitarian. Weren’t both stronger than the Western democracies? How thankful we should be that they fought each other!
Yet both and the Japanese as well grew strong in the face of Western democratic weakness. At any time during the decade after W.W. I the Soviets could have been squashed, up through Czechoslovakia in 1938 the NAZIs could have been stopped, and during the same decade the Japanese might have gone North, up against the Soviets, in their expansion, but for the perceived weakness of the British, eager to withdraw from India, and the perceived weakness of the self-isolating Americans. Second to tyranny, pacificism is the greatest cause of war and its miseries. Christian morals without the Christian God defeated pagan morals without the pagan gods, but not because they were stronger, only because at one critical instant there was a man of ancient virtue to turn to, Churchill, and for the rest because they were more numerous, productive, and better armed.
(However, one should consider Rommel’s praise of the American troops. Also ask whether the German troops were militant pagans like the Nazis and whether the Russian troops were, like their Communist masters, militant atheists.)
What Do We Learn about Statesmanship?
Churchill, it seems, thought the bombing of the French Fleet the most difficult, certainly the most painful, decision he had to make during the whole war. He thought he made the right decision, yet it also cost him the most tears. Over this decision and this decision alone, he cried twice or thrice. I do not think he cried over any of the others. Of the bombing campaign, he once exclaimed,.”What! Are we beasts?” But he did not, I think, cry.
That means all the others, however difficult, were less difficult. In them there was plenty of toil, sweat, and blood, but not tears. The toil was ceaseless, the volume of matters requiring attention immense, the decisions to be made weighty, the things to be written, speeches, letters, minutes, and orders, voluminous. The sweat for a man nearing seventy was considerable, the long flights in the cold upper air, the longer sea voyages, and the ever present the risks. Churchill never shed blood but the risks was always there, it was never evaded, and often, to the dismay of more cautious spirits, courted. And blood was always there being shed in his heart for the casualties, both actual and potential, of the war, since the statesman‘s choice so often means death or injury. He purposes not his death who sends a man into combat, but he cannot help considering how greater foresight might have avoided deaths and greater daring saved lives.
Likeness, Analogies, and Contrasts with Shakespeare:
Cf. Churchill’s salute to Rommel and Henry V’s salute to Mount Joy; it is chivalrous to recognize virtue in a mortal opponent; however, these salutes are not only chivalrous, but sagacious; the man saluted knew he could depend on good treatment from the man saluting; later Rommel was a part of the 20 July conspiracy, which had it succeeded in establishing a new regime, would have sought a separate peace in the west; Mount Joy could expect the same good treatment in a France ruled by Henry V.
Churchill trying to educate the Americans, like the good Duke Humphrey trying to educate young Henry VI.
Churchill led into the bombing of Dresden, like Joan of Arc calling on fiends.
Oran vaguely comparable to Brutus in JC; when to part from a friend? Or with Henry V disappointing Falstaff. Or Henry quickly executing the conspirators, while wishing them well.
At the time of the Oran attack, Jack Colville showed Churchill 3 Henry VI (4.1.39-46) on English foreign policy towards France; Fringes of Power (N.Y.: Norton, 1985), p. 181.
Likeness, Analogies, and Contrasts With Machiavelli:
How not to do good; yes of Oran, but after exhausting avenues, and so as to do good. Impossible to imagine Machiavelli weeping, as Churchill did before the House after explaining the attack on the French fleet at Oran.
Yes, not to avoid war, if it will be worse. But peace really is better than war.
On Lord Moran: “No man is a hero to his doctor. But that says more about doctors than heroes. The valets, who served some of our predecessors, were better. They served living well; doctors serve mere living. And those valets did live well. Consider both how well Bunker serves Lord Peter and Jeeves and how well they themselves live at the same time. The valet who was critical of the master he served thought if their places were exchanged that he could live his master’s life better than he could. Doctors do not feel they can respirate better than their patients.”
Churchill Movies; Young Winston; Wilderness Years (?) with Richard Burton; War in the World series
On the Holocaust. “Never again” well, yes then vote for Churchill next time, not Chamberlain, MacDonald, Baldwin, and all the other pacificists and appeasers.
Churchill quotations:
Winston S. Churchill became Prime Minister of Great Britain on May 10, 1940–the evening before Adolf Hitler launched his attack upon France and the Low Countries. Within days of his assumption of the highest office, Churchill would lead a nation alone against a monstrous and overwhelmingly powerful enemy. Many within his own party–within his own cabinet–favored a peace that would likely have left Hitler with his conquests.
At one cabinet meeting, Churchill made an impromptu speech. He said that he had considered carefully “whether it was part of my duty to consider entering into negotiations with That Man …. I am convinced that every man of you would rise up and tear me down from my place if I were for one moment to contemplate parley or surrender. If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.” This was the attitude that saved the West.
On this date, 1940, Churchill spoke similar, more famous, words. In this time of prosperity, it is well to remember them.
“You ask, what is our policy? I will say: it is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalog of human crime. That is our policy.
“You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival. Let that be realized; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal.
“But I take up my task with buoyancy and hope. I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men. At this time I feel entitled to claim the aid of all, and I say, ‘Come then, let us go forward together with our united strength.'”
According to Elizabeth Nel, Churchill’s secretary, his daily routine never changed. During the period when he lived and worked in the Number 10 Annex, it looked something like this:
* 8.00am Churchill woke, had breakfast and went into the bathroom
* 8.30am Churchill looked through all of the daily newspapers.
* 9.00am One of Churchill’s secretaries would sit on the end of his bed with a noiseless typewriter while he dictated. The Prime Minister would work on his black locking box which contained secret papers and documents. If there were no visits or meetings with the Cabinet or Chiefs of Staff scheduled, he would stay in bed until lunchtime. (It was from his bed that Churchill dictated papers, speeches and telegrams to President Roosevelt.)
* 1.00pm Churchill would have a bath.
* 1.30pm lunch in Number 10.
* After lunch Churchill would go to the House of Commons and/or work on speeches in the Cabinet Room in Number 10 with a secretary waiting in the room next door to take dictation when necessary.
* 6.00pm Churchill would get undressed, put on his nightclothes and have an hour sleep.
* 7.00pm After waking and getting dressed he would eat, and then work in Number 10 or in the Annex until 2-3 am.
Planning your visit
Address: Cabinet War Rooms Clive Steps
King Charles Street London SW1A 2AQ
United Kingdom Telephone enquiries: 020 7930 6961 (international +44 20 7930 6961)
Map: Click here for map
Fax: 020 7839 5897 Email: cwr@iwm.org.uk
Open daily: 1 October – 31 March 10:00 – 18:00 (last admission 17:15 pm)
1 April – 30 September 09:30 – 18:00 (last admission 17:15 pm)
Admission: From 31 March 2003 Adults: £7.00
Children: free (for children under 16 and for all pupils in pre-booked school parties)
Concessions: £5.50 ES40: £3.50
Group Rates: Discounted admission rates for groups of ten or more.
Nearest underground: Westminster or St James’s Park
Nearest train: Charing Cross
Bus: 3, 11, 12, 24, 53, 77a, 88, 109, 159, 184, 211
See Transport for London for further details.
Car: Please note: the Cabinet War Rooms are situated within the London Congestion Charge zone. See http://www.cclondon.com for further details.
Switchroom
Cafeteria The newly opened Switchroom cafeteria is a great place to relax with a range of hot and cold food freshly prepared here on the premises, along with a variety of beverages on offer.
Open 7 days a week from 10.00am until 5.00pm, the cafeteria is located halfway through the tour but visits to the cafeteria can be taken at any time. The cafeteria also houses interesting photographic artefacts from the Second World War to view.
The sound guide facility operates on an induction loop. Visitors unable to use this system will be given a free copy of the guide book to the Rooms.
All visitors are provided with a free personal Acoustiguide sound guide, available in English (adult and children’s version), French, German, Italian, Spanish, Hebrew, Swedish and Dutch.
for Parliament: http://www.parliament.uk/
for War Rooms: Big website available: http://www.iwm.org.uk/cabinet/
http://www.churchillspeeches.com/
[1] The Gathering Storm, Chapter XX (“The Soviet Enigma”), p. 326.
[2] As a young statesman, in the period 1908-1911, Churchill distributed copies of the Prince to friends; see Manfred Weidhorn, Sir Winston Churchill (Boston: Twayne, 1979) p. 75.
[3] Consider Borges’ story “Deutsches Requiem.”
[4] See Road to Victory, pp. 1219-1220; 1257-1258;1176; the story these pages tell has nothing of Dresden as a knockout blow to German resistance, only as a blow to communication and German ability to transfer troops from West to East. (That the Germans chose to transfer troops from West to East shows the comparative weakness of Allied pressure on the ground against them or, perhaps, a greater German desire to surrender land in the West to the democracies than in the East to the tyranny. In the event, Eisenhower, after considerable if slow progress in the West actually withdrew from the line his armies had reached.)
[5] Apparently not. In Never Despair Martin Gilbert mentions a letter of Churchill’s asking Attlee to honor Hughes.
[6] See Gilbert Martin, The Holocaust (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1985), p. 792.
[7] Stalin’s suggestion suggests the Soviets were guilty of killing the Polish Officer Corps; certainly it proves they would not have shrank from such a deed; not that Hitler would shrink either.
[8] Consider how DeGaulle did not let his supporters go very far in punishing all the Vichy collaborators. Of course Petain was tried and found guilty, but his punishment was mild. Cf. Jean Dutourd’s Best Butter and that other novel.
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